Physical and Human Components of Military Geography

[This blog post has been published by Dr Craig Wright’s editor on behalf of Dr Wright.]

Military geography played a crucial role in determining the outcome during the “Sichelschnitt” campaign (Hanley, 2009), known as Case Yellow, which led to the Fall of France in 1940 (Frieser, 2013). To understand this, we shall examine one physical component represented by the Ardennes Forest (Harrison & Passmore, 2021) and one human component attributed to the French defensive strategy. Together we shall look at how they contributed to the German success and French defeat.

1. Physical Component: The Ardennes Forest

The Ardennes Forest, located in Belgium and extending into Luxembourg and France, was a critical geographical feature in the German strategy during the “Sichelschnitt” campaign, or Case Yellow, in 1940 (Harrison & Passmore, 2021). Historically, the dense woodland, challenging topography, and limited road network of the Ardennes were viewed as barriers to large-scale mechanized offensives (Desch, 2002). The region’s forests and rough terrain created natural obstacles that made it difficult to maneuver large armored units. Hence, it was generally perceived as a defensive geographical feature rather than a viable route for an attacking army.

            Yet, the German military command during World War II, under the leadership of General Erich von Manstein, chose to challenge this conventional wisdom. They saw an opportunity, whereas others saw an obstacle. The Germans assumed that the French would not anticipate a significant offensive through this seemingly inhospitable region and leave it lightly defended (Horne, 2012). This assumption was rooted in the German understanding of French military doctrine and strategy, which prioritized static defensive lines like the Maginot Line.

            The German military meticulously planned the offensive through the Ardennes, addressing the logistical challenges that the region posed. They had specific Panzer units trained to negotiate the rugged terrain and narrow paths. The element of surprise was crucial, and they managed to maintain it until the offensive was well underway (Syron, 2013).

            Launching their Panzer divisions through the Ardennes, the Germans managed to achieve a surprise that left the French and their allies scrambling. The Germans’ ability to navigate the forest’s challenging terrain with armored units was a feat of military logistics and planning that surprised the Allies (Shoemaker, 1964). This daring strategy involved significant risk, but its successful execution led to the encirclement and defeat of a significant part of the Allied forces in Belgium, contributing to the rapid fall of France in June 1940.

            The Germans’ unexpected use of the Ardennes Forest in their offensive highlights the importance of geographical understanding in military strategy. By recognizing the strategic potential of the “impassable” Ardennes and successfully negotiating its physical challenges, the Germans could turn a perceived disadvantage into a significant strategic advantage (Roberts, 2009). It underscores the point that understanding and unexpectedly leveraging geographical features can significantly influence the outcome of military operations.

2. Human Component: French Defensive Strategy

The French experiences in WW1 profoundly influenced the country’s military strategy during the early stages of World War II (Ahlstrom & Wang, 2009). A notable aspect of such influence was the French military’s firm reliance on static defence, embodied by the heavily fortified Maginot Line, concrete fortifications, obstacles, and weapon installations stretching along the French-German and French-Italian borders (Gray, 1999). This defensive construct was rooted in the French High Command’s anticipation of a war of attrition similar to the trench warfare of WWI, where defensive lines played a vital role.

            Yet, this reliance on fixed fortifications failed to account for the evolution of warfare tactics and strategy. The Germans had developed a new form of mobile warfare known as blitzkrieg or “lightning war.” This innovative strategy emphasized rapid, concentrated force and prioritized speed and surprize over the more traditional slow accumulation of advantage (Clark, 2016). The blitzkrieg approach aimed to disrupt enemy lines, focusing on deep penetrations into enemy territory to sever communications and supply lines, leading to confusion and disorder among the enemy ranks.

            In contrast to this dynamic approach, the French continued to adhere to their static defense and linear warfare strategy, which was heavily focused on holding lines and positional warfare. This approach did not equip them to effectively counter the fast and fluid tactics of the German blitzkrieg (Clark, 2016). When the German forces launched their swift advance through the Ardennes, a region weakly defended due to the French belief in its natural protection, they bypassed the primary French defenses along the Maginot Line and Belgium.

            This German maneuver led to the encirclement of the main Allied forces in Belgium. Cut off from reinforcements and supplies and facing the highly mobile and coordinated German forces, the French and their allies found themselves unable to mount an effective counter-offensive (Showalter, 2009). The speed of the German advance, combined with the French’s ill-suited defensive strategy, led to a rapid collapse of the French defense, ultimately culminating in the fall of France in June 1940.

            This episode underscores the importance of adaptability and strategic foresight in military strategy. It highlights the dangers of over-reliance on past experiences and the necessity to continuously reassess and adapt military strategy in light of evolving technologies, tactics, and enemy capabilities.

Are These Factors Still Considerations Today?

Not only do these factors remain vital considerations today, but they always shall. The considerations of physical geography, including terrain, weather, and climate, remain critical in modern military planning. As for the human component, the strategy and tactics employed by a military force continue to shape outcomes. Yet, the context has changed significantly with the advancement of technology. The modern battlefield extends into domains such as cyber and space (Hoffman, 2007). In the era of precision-guided munitions, unmanned systems, and cyber warfare, geographic considerations have become multi-dimensional. It’s not just about physical terrain but also the electronic and cyber terrain.

            Despite such changes, the lessons from Case Yellow are still pertinent. The understanding of geography, both physical and human, and its incorporation into military strategy is as crucial as ever. Adapting to new forms of warfare, and not becoming overly reliant on fixed fortifications, presents a lesson directly applicable to today’s rapidly evolving battlefield (Gady & Stronell, 2020).

            In conclusion, the Battle of Marathon and Case Yellow provide valuable lessons on the importance of integrating an understanding of geography into military planning and strategy (Tuck, 2022). Even with the evolution of warfare, such lessons continue to hold relevance today. They underline the importance of adaptability, understanding the terrain (physical and electronic), and the necessity of robust strategic planning in military operations.

References

Ahlstrom, D., & Wang, L. C. (2009). Groupthink and France’s defeat in the 1940 campaign. Journal of Management History, 15(2), 159–177. https://doi.org/10.1108/17511340910943804

Clark, L. (2016). Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality and Hitler’s Lightning War – France, 1940. Atlantic Books.

Desch, M. (2002). Planning War in Peacetime. Joint Forces Quarterly, 30, 94–104.

Frieser, K.-H. (2013). The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Naval Institute Press.

Gady, F.-S., & Stronell, A. (2020). Cyber Capabilities and Multi-Domain Operations in Future High-Intensity Warfare in 2030. Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, 151.

Gray, C. S. (1999). Inescapable geography. Journal of Strategic Studies, 22(2–3), 161–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399908437759

Harrison, S., & Passmore, D. G. (2021). On Geography and War: New Perspectives on the Ardennes Campaigns of 1940 and 1944. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 111(4), 1079–1093. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2020.1807307

Hoffman, F. G. (2007). Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Arlington.

Horne, A. (2012). To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Pan Macmillan.

Roberts, A. (2009). The storm of war: A new history of the Second World War. Penguin UK.

Shoemaker, J. O. (1964). An analysis of the effect of civil-military relations in the Third Reich on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940.

Showalter, D. (2009). Hitler’s Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare. Penguin.

Syron, M. (2013). Panzerkrieg: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Tank Divisions. Hachette UK.

Tuck, C. (2022). Understanding Land Warfare. Routledge.

[This blog post has been published by Dr Craig Wright’s editor on behalf of Dr Wright.]



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