Aristotle – Nicomachean Ethics
The Nicomachean Ethics is focused on human happiness or fulfillment and well-being. Aristotle notes how happiness is a fundamental subject of human interest across all societies. It is a natural aspect of humanity to seek happiness. There is always an underlying aspect of seeking to become happy in finding other purposes. Those aspects of human life the people call good and seek to achieve include happiness, which stands out as one of the primary goals sought. Importantly, unlike many other goals, happiness is something that, if achieved, may be achieved at rest and without a necessity to continue to change.1
Therefore, Aristotle sees happiness as the pinnacle of all that is good. Through the Nicomacbean Ethic, Aristotle attempts to define a sense of a universal underlying factor of happiness that all of humanity share and not merely his definition. Like many other topics covered, happiness, like justice, is something ill-defined. The use of the word happiness is not something that is a mere representation of joy at a particular time or the opposite of a particularly sad moment. Life is not merely a series of good and bad events but rather extends deeper than this.
Consequently, happiness cannot merely be seen as the totality of good moments. To Aristotle, Happiness is achieved as a whole through a good life which is developed and nurtured over time. The founding fathers of the United States understood the concept of the pursuit of happiness and included this within the Declaration of Independence. In this understanding, the founding fathers saw that it is not merely enjoyment but rather the ability to improve ourselves and build a wholesome life. Through this, happiness cannot be merely a human right to pleasure. In an analysis of Happiness, Aristotle understood that only at the end of our life can we look back and see whether a life has been truly happy and good.
Comparing Aristotle’s ethics to Plato’s Republic
In reviewing the Republic by Plato, we saw that each work and each author dealt with both morals and ethics. The authors sought to reflect their perspective concerning a good or moral life in each instance. However, we will also see vast differences between both Plato and Aristotle in how they each see ethical behaviour. In each instance, the two works are very different in style. Plato writing in dialogue was Aristotle does not use this form at all.
This position makes it more difficult to see Plato’s perspective than understanding Aristotle’s. This is because Plato uses dialogue with other characters representing the argument and never himself. In this, he always speaks through and as a mouthpiece via Socrates. Further, Socrates is not seen in expounding a position but rather as the gadfly questioning another. This form of dialogue extracts views from people and draws out an answer, but it becomes difficult to understand the author’s perspective in this process.
Aristotle may have some difficult writings, but it is always Aristotle presenting his views in each case. In this manner, Aristotle gives us an insight into how he sees the world and what his opinion is. In reading multiple Platonic dialogues, the reader starts to understand the methodology used to discern Plato’s opinion on the issue and problem being discussed. For example, in chapter 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Plato is mentioned by Aristotle. Aristotle is not supporting the Platonic opinion but rather seeks to refute it. As such, we can see that each of the authors hold a differing opinion on morality.
What is Happiness?
Before we can define what is meant by the pursuit of happiness, we must understand what happiness is.2 To Plato, the question posited in the Republic starts not with happiness but with “what is justice”? The difference between these two authors is quite dark, and whilst Aristotle covers justice and the law, it requires that an individual hold a code of moral virtue before these can be answered. In beginning his moral treaters, Aristotle poses the question of “what is happiness?” In doing this, we see a deliberate choice of a different starting point as Aristotle will have well-known Plato’s work.3
Both Plato and Aristotle discuss the nature of politics. In this, each author’s order of the values defined and held represent some of the differences in how they see morality and politics. To Plato, the state is used in explaining morality, and it is the state that Plato sees as a means of making people right. In this, justice is something imbued across society and over men. Aristotle approaches this from a different perspective starting from ethics and virtue and only then progressing into politics. To Plato, the collective or the state represents the greatest good. To Aristotle, the individual needs to create a sense of moral well-being before the state can develop.4
Aristotle approaches each of the topics he investigates far more methodological than Plato. In many ways, we can see Aristotle as a proto-scientist. Even when addressing the subject of ethics, Aristotle seeks to classify and document in a systematic and ontological manner. On the other hand, Plato is rather open and, in questioning, does not often document many of the aspects of a topic. In this, the dialogue form can be seen to be more closely aligned to human discussions but equally manages to cover far less. The range of topics included in the Nicomachean Ethics is far deeper and more complete than Plato’s discussion in the Republic.
Plato documents certain aspects of courage, temperament, and friendship, looking at pleasure and how this reflects happiness. Compared to Aristotle, the areas that are not covered become more apparent. While Plato does later works, Aristotle addresses them right from the beginning. Plato documents courage in Laches, temperance in Charmides, friendship in Lysis, and pleasure in Philebus. So, in some ways, the difference in how the authors address topics that they see as important also provides information on their opinions about them.
Because of the diverse nature of natural dialogue, Plato covers ethical topics across various works. However, the other difficulty with this approach is that any particular dialogue is less organised and does not cover any particular topic on the same level as Aristotle does in his treatise. Further, the systematic approach taken by Aristotle provides a better organisation and access to information than the dialogue methodology. The readily apparent structure divided into separate books and chapters starts with an introduction in Book I, works into more depth and goes into far greater depth in Books II – X.
Aiming towards good
The Nicomachean ethics begins by noting that “[e]very art and every enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good.” In this, we see the primary focus of Aristotle’s enquiry. The primary focus of this treatise is in discovering what is best in creating a life that is worth living and admirable. It is the good of action and derived of an active life. In this, it is not merely some good or pleasure achieved through a simple query or even from the output of an artifice achieved. This treatise has a focus on ethics and human action.
There is an aspect of this work that reflects that of Mises centuries and millennia later. In Human Action, von Mises focuses on individual virtue and right society.5 Mises, Menger and other Austrian economists held a purposeful thought of Neo-Aristotelian philosophies, and all argued for a position that could best enhance human flourishing.6 This, of course, mirrors many of the concepts of ethics promoted by Aristotle, and it needs to be remembered that ethics is a system that tells us not what to do but what we ought to do.
“If, then there are some and of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake; everything else being desired for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else; for at that rate process would go on to infinity so that our desire would be empty in vain; clearly this must be the good and achieve good.”
Aristotle demonstrates that the end of ethics is the greatest good. In this, as with Mises, it must follow that all human actions have an end in something that we consider to be good. Without some ultimate good or desire that we seek as goodness, it becomes impossible to ask the question, “what is the aim of this action?” For, without such an end, we have the result of an infinite regression with one desire leading to another endlessly.
For this reason, Aristotle argues that even the first action made by anybody would be thrown into doubt if we could not accept that some end in itself is good. For example, seeking some desirable end A, we could note that A is only desirable due to B, from where we could further argue B is only desirable due to C ad infinitum. Therefore, there is no end to this infinite regression, and nothing can ever be achieved. In such a state, nothing can be demonstrated to be desirable. As Aristotle noted, anything would only be desirable on the assumption that it is focused on another thing and hence itself not true. Moreover, the end of an infinite series can never be reached, so we know there is no end to such a regression.
An example could be made in a series of promissory notes or contracts. Each of these could be represented as a cheque based upon the deposit and promise of another to pay. Here, if Bob has promised Alice that he will pay fifty dollars if Charlie pays Bob fifty dollars but only if Dave will pay Charlie fifty dollars and from there only if Elan will pay fifty dollars to Dave et cetera to infinity. We understand that Alice will never receive fifty dollars in such a scenario. For this to occur, some individual needs to pay another unconditionally. As each payment is conditional on someone else’s payment, the series of promises becomes infinite and worthless. Aristotle would represent this as good not based on its goodness but that of something else.
In chapter 4, Aristotle notes:
“let us continue an enquiry and state in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good… What is the highest of all goods available by action? Verbally there is a very general agreement for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness.”
This verbal agreement is clearly no more than that, and to this, Aristotle would continue stating, “concerning what happiness is they differ in that many do not give the same account as the wise”. Happiness continues to be a theme throughout this work. In chapter 7, Aristotle discusses the fundamental aspects of what defines happiness. “Not all and is our final ends, but the chief good is evidently something final… And therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else”.
Happiness is defined as something good in itself by Aristotle. It is sufficient and doesn’t require anything more. In this, happiness stands on its own.
“Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be for this we choose always for itself and another for the sake of something else but honour, pleasure, reason and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves; for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them, but we shall choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand no one chooses for the sake of these nor in general for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient … The self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing and such we think happiness to be … happiness than is something final and self-sufficient and is the end of action.”
Aristotle does not leave us thinking that he has given us a definition of happiness. As with Plato in the works before, Aristotle remains dissatisfied with the answer that he is given. From this, Aristotle begins the next paragraph stating, “presumably however to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude”. Unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn’t leave us hanging and seeks to give us a more prosaic definition. In this, Aristotle considers the good of any particular thing to be a function derived from its own being. For example, the good of a nail resides in its function of holding planks together. If it does this well, it is good. Equally, the chef’s good is in making food, but others wish to eat.
The question that must follow is what is the function of man?
If we cannot understand the function that each of us has as humanity, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine our chief good. To Aristotle, he would see it as such:
“We state the function amount to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, Newman good turns out to be the activity of soul in accordance with virtue and there are more than one virtue in accordance with the best and most complete.”
From this, it becomes clear that Aristotle places great emphasis on completeness. “Happiness is something final and self-sufficient”.7 “Human good consists of activity of the soul in accordance with the best and most complete virtue”. In this, the most critical aspect of how we define and see happiness, according to Aristotle, is creating something that is both sufficient and complete. To Aristotle, the individual “lacking in nothing” must be truly happy.8
To define this further, we see that:
“he is happy who was active in accordance with the complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance. But throughout a complete life. Or must we add and who is destined to live thus and dies as befits his life? Certainly the future is obscure to us while happiness we claim is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those amongst living men in whom these conditions are and are to be fulfilled but happy men.”
A happy person, to Aristotle, leads a good life. That is a life of virtue and not a life merely a pleasure. To Aristotle, a happy person does not merely have a good time but achieves good. Whilst enjoyment and pleasure may be desirable and are not in themselves bad; these are passing events. The feeling of pleasure does not have sufficiency and without that is not, to Aristotle a good.
Aristotle places happiness as something hard to achieve and something to strive to obtain. So it is the pursuit of happiness that the virtuous individual may hope to obtain. Happiness, to Aristotle, is a moral quality that incorporates all of the virtues that are gained over an entire lifetime. From this, we see Aristotle recognises happiness is only a part of a complete and satisfying life.
Aiming towards good
Defining the Role of External Goods Towards Happiness
Many people seek wealth and possessions and believe that this will bring them happiness. While this is not Aristotle’s view, Aristotle’s life and understanding of happiness were not ascetic. To Aristotle, those ill or destitute are not capable of being as happy as someone who was well off and physically sound. In being an activity of the soul, happiness, to Aristotle, involves reason. Aristotle is not otherworldly as some would be and are not monkish in rejecting worldly goods. To Aristotle, the happy man must share goods and hold possessions.9
What Is a Complete Life and How Does This Represent Happiness?
From Oedipus the King in our previous section, we remember the phrase:
“We must call no one happy who is of the mortal race until he has crossed life’s border, free from pain.”
Aristotle also refers to a phrase from Solon. Herodotus notes and refers to the story of Solon and Croesus.10
“When all these conquests had been added to the Lydian empire, and the prosperity of Sardis was now at its height, there came thither, one after another, all the sages of Greece living at the time, and among them Solon, the Athenian. He was on his travels, having left Athens to be absent ten years, under the pretence of wishing to see the world, but really to avoid being forced to repeal any of the laws which, at the request of the Athenians, he had made for them. Without his sanction the Athenians could not repeal them, as they had bound themselves under a heavy curse to be governed for ten years by the laws which should be imposed on them by Solon.
On this account, as well as to see the world, Solon set out upon his travels, in the course of which he went to Egypt to the court of Amasis, and also came on a visit to Croesus at Sardis. Croesus received him as his guest, and lodged him in the royal palace. On the third or fourth day after, he bade his servants conduct Solon. over his treasuries, and show him all their greatness and magnificence. When he had seen them all, and, so far as time allowed, inspected them, Croesus addressed this question to him. “Stranger of Athens, we have heard much of thy wisdom and of thy travels through many lands, from love of knowledge and a wish to see the world. I am curious therefore to inquire of thee, whom, of all the men that thou hast seen, thou deemest the most happy?” This he asked because he thought himself the happiest of mortals: but Solon answered him without flattery, according to his true sentiments, “Tellus of Athens, sire.” Full of astonishment at what he heard, Croesus demanded sharply, “And wherefore dost thou deem Tellus happiest?” To which the other replied, “First, because his country was flourishing in his days, and he himself had sons both beautiful and good, and he lived to see children born to each of them, and these children all grew up; and further because, after a life spent in what our people look upon as comfort, his end was surpassingly glorious. In a battle between the Athenians and their neighbours near Eleusis, he came to the assistance of his countrymen, routed the foe, and died upon the field most gallantly. The Athenians gave him a public funeral on the spot where he fell, and paid him the highest honours.”
Thus did Solon admonish Croesus by the example of Tellus, enumerating the manifold particulars of his happiness. When he had ended, Croesus inquired a second time, who after Tellus seemed to him the happiest, expecting that at any rate, he would be given the second place. “Cleobis and Bito,” Solon answered; “they were of Argive race; their fortune was enough for their wants, and they were besides endowed with so much bodily strength that they had both gained prizes at the Games. Also this tale is told of them:- There was a great festival in honour of the goddess Juno at Argos, to which their mother must needs be taken in a car. Now the oxen did not come home from the field in time: so the youths, fearful of being too late, put the yoke on their own necks, and themselves drew the car in which their mother rode. Five and forty furlongs did they draw her, and stopped before the temple. This deed of theirs was witnessed by the whole assembly of worshippers, and then their life closed in the best possible way. Herein, too, God showed forth most evidently, how much better a thing for man death is than life. For the Argive men, who stood around the car, extolled the vast strength of the youths; and the Argive women extolled the mother who was blessed with such a pair of sons; and the mother herself, overjoyed at the deed and at the praises it had won, standing straight before the image, besought the goddess to bestow on Cleobis and Bito, the sons who had so mightily honoured her, the highest blessing to which mortals can attain. Her prayer ended, they offered sacrifice and partook of the holy banquet, after which the two youths fell asleep in the temple. They never woke more, but so passed from the earth. The Argives, looking on them as among the best of men, caused statues of them to be made, which they gave to the shrine at Delphi.”
When Solon had thus assigned these youths the second place, Croesus broke in angrily, “What, stranger of Athens, is my happiness, then, so utterly set at nought by thee, that thou dost not even put me on a level with private men?”
“Oh! Croesus,” replied the other, “thou askedst a question concerning the condition of man, of one who knows that the power above us is full of jealousy, and fond of troubling our lot. A long life gives one to witness much, and experience much oneself, that one would not choose. Seventy years I regard as the limit of the life of man. In these seventy years are contained, without reckoning intercalary months, twenty-five thousand and two hundred days. Add an intercalary month to every other year, that the seasons may come round at the right time, and there will be, besides the seventy years, thirty-five such months, making an addition of one thousand and fifty days. The whole number of the days contained in the seventy years will thus be twenty-six thousand two hundred and fifty, whereof not one but will produce events unlike the rest. Hence man is wholly accident. For thyself, oh! Croesus, I see that thou art wonderfully rich, and art the lord of many nations; but with respect to that whereon thou questionest me, I have no answer to give, until I hear that thou hast closed thy life happily. For assuredly he who possesses great store of riches is no nearer happiness than he who has what suffices for his daily needs, unless it so hap that luck attend upon him, and so he continue in the enjoyment of all his good things to the end of life. For many of the wealthiest men have been unfavoured of fortune, and many whose means were moderate have had excellent luck. Men of the former class excel those of the latter but in two respects; these last excel the former in many. The wealthy man is better able to content his desires, and to bear up against a sudden buffet of calamity. The other has less ability to withstand these evils (from which, however, his good luck keeps him clear), but he enjoys all these following blessings: he is whole of limb, a stranger to disease, free from misfortune, happy in his children, and comely to look upon. If, in addition to all this, he end his life well, he is of a truth the man of whom thou art in search, the man who may rightly be termed happy. Call him, however, until he die, not happy but fortunate. Scarcely, indeed, can any man unite all these advantages: as there is no country which contains within it all that it needs, but each, while it possesses some things, lacks others, and the best country is that which contains the most; so no single human being is complete in every respect- something is always lacking. He who unites the greatest number of advantages, and retaining them to the day of his death, then dies peaceably, that man alone, sire, is, in my judgment, entitled to bear the name of ‘happy.’ But in every matter it behoves us to mark well the end: for oftentimes God gives men a gleam of happiness, and then plunges them into ruin.”
Such was the speech which Solon addressed to Croesus, a speech which brought him neither largess nor honour. The king saw him depart with much indifference, since he thought that a man must be an arrant fool who made no account of present good, but bade men always wait and mark the end.
After Solon had gone away a dreadful vengeance, sent of God, came upon Croesus, to punish him, it is likely, for deeming himself the happiest of men. First he had a dream in the night, which foreshowed him truly the evils that were about to befall him in the person of his son. For Croesus had two sons, one blasted by a natural defect, being deaf and dumb; the other, distinguished far above all his co-mates in every pursuit. The name of the last was Atys. It was this son concerning whom he dreamt a dream that he would die by the blow of an iron weapon. When he woke, he considered earnestly with himself, and, greatly alarmed at the dream, instantly made his son take a wife, and whereas in former years the youth had been wont to command the Lydian forces in the field, he now would not suffer him to accompany them. All the spears and javelins, and weapons used in the wars, he removed out of the male apartments, and laid them in heaps in the chambers of the women, fearing lest perhaps one of the weapons that hung against the wall might fall and strike him.
Now it chanced that while he was making arrangements for the wedding, there came to Sardis a man under a misfortune, who had upon him the stain of blood. He was by race a Phrygian, and belonged to the family of the king. Presenting himself at the palace of Croesus, he prayed to be admitted to purification according to the customs of the country. Now the Lydian method of purifying is very nearly the same as the Greek. Croesus granted the request, and went through all the customary rites, after which he asked the suppliant of his birth and country, addressing him as follows:- “Who art thou, stranger, and from what part of Phrygia fleddest thou to take refuge at my hearth? And whom, moreover, what man or what woman, hast thou slain?” “Oh! king,” replied the Phrygian, “I am the son of Gordias, son of Midas. I am named Adrastus. The man I unintentionally slew was my own brother. For this my father drove me from the land, and I lost all. Then fled I here to thee.” “Thou art the offspring,” Croesus rejoined, “of a house friendly to mine, and thou art come to friends. Thou shalt want for nothing so long as thou abidest in my dominions. Bear thy misfortune as easily as thou mayest, so will it go best with thee.” Thenceforth Adrastus lived in the palace of the king.
It chanced that at this very same time there was in the Mysian Olympus a huge monster of a boar, which went forth often from this mountain country, and wasted the corn-fields of the Mysians. Many a time had the Mysians collected to hunt the beast, but instead of doing him any hurt, they came off always with some loss to themselves. At length they sent ambassadors to Croesus, who delivered their message to him in these words: “Oh! king, a mighty monster of a boar has appeared in our parts, and destroys the labour of our hands. We do our best to take him, but in vain. Now therefore we beseech thee to let thy son accompany us back, with some chosen youths and hounds, that we may rid our country of the animal.” Such was the tenor of their prayer.
But Croesus bethought him of his dream, and answered, “Say no more of my son going with you; that may not be in any wise. He is but just joined in wedlock, and is busy enough with that. I will grant you a picked band of Lydians, and all my huntsmen and hounds; and I will charge those whom I send to use all zeal in aiding you to rid your country of the brute.”
With this reply the Mysians were content; but the king’s son, hearing what the prayer of the Mysians was, came suddenly in, and on the refusal of Croesus to let him go with them, thus addressed his father: “Formerly, my father, it was deemed the noblest and most suitable thing for me to frequent the wars and hunting-parties, and win myself glory in them; but now thou keepest me away from both, although thou hast never beheld in me either cowardice or lack of spirit. What face meanwhile must I wear as I walk to the forum or return from it? What must the citizens, what must my young bride think of me? What sort of man will she suppose her husband to be? Either, therefore, let me go to the chase of this boar, or give me a reason why it is best for me to do according to thy wishes.”
Then Croesus answered, “My son, it is not because I have seen in thee either cowardice or aught else which has displeased me that I keep thee back; but because a vision which came before me in a dream as I slept, warned me that thou wert doomed to die young, pierced by an iron weapon. It was this which first led me to hasten on thy wedding, and now it hinders me from sending thee upon this enterprise. Fain would I keep watch over thee, if by any means I may cheat fate of thee during my own lifetime. For thou art the one and only son that I possess; the other, whose hearing is destroyed, I regard as if he were not.”
“Ah! father,” returned the youth, “I blame thee not for keeping watch over me after a dream so terrible; but if thou mistakest, if thou dost not apprehend the dream aright, ’tis no blame for me to show thee wherein thou errest. Now the dream, thou saidst thyself, foretold that I should die stricken by an iron weapon. But what hands has a boar to strike with? What iron weapon does he wield? Yet this is what thou fearest for me. Had the dream said that I should die pierced by a tusk, then thou hadst done well to keep me away; but it said a weapon. Now here we do not combat men, but a wild animal. I pray thee, therefore, let me go with them.”
“There thou hast me, my son,” said Croesus, “thy interpretation is better than mine. I yield to it, and change my mind, and consent to let thee go.”
Then the king sent for Adrastus, the Phrygian, and said to him, “Adrastus, when thou wert smitten with the rod of affliction- no reproach, my friend- I purified thee, and have taken thee to live with me in my palace, and have been at every charge. Now, therefore, it behoves thee to requite the good offices which thou hast received at my hands by consenting to go with my son on this hunting party, and to watch over him, if perchance you should be attacked upon the road by some band of daring robbers. Even apart from this, it were right for thee to go where thou mayest make thyself famous by noble deeds. They are the heritage of thy family, and thou too art so stalwart and strong.”
Adrastus answered, “Except for thy request, Oh! king, I would rather have kept away from this hunt; for methinks it ill beseems a man under a misfortune such as mine to consort with his happier compeers; and besides, I have no heart to it. On many grounds I had stayed behind; but, as thou urgest it, and I am bound to pleasure thee (for truly it does behove me to requite thy good offices), I am content to do as thou wishest. For thy son, whom thou givest into my charge, be sure thou shalt receive him back safe and sound, so far as depends upon a guardian’s carefulness.”
Thus assured, Croesus let them depart, accompanied by a band of picked youths, and well provided with dogs of chase. When they reached Olympus, they scattered in quest of the animal; he was soon found, and the hunters, drawing round him in a circle, hurled their weapons at him. Then the stranger, the man who had been purified of blood, whose name was Adrastus, he also hurled his spear at the boar, but missed his aim, and struck Atys. Thus was the son of Croesus slain by the point of an iron weapon, and the warning of the vision was fulfilled. Then one ran to Sardis to bear the tidings to the king, and he came and informed him of the combat and of the fate that had befallen his son.
If it was a heavy blow to the father to learn that his child was dead, it yet more strongly affected him to think that the very man whom he himself once purified had done the deed. In the violence of his grief he called aloud on Jupiter Catharsius to be a witness of what he had suffered at the stranger’s hands. Afterwards he invoked the same god as Jupiter Ephistius and Hetaereus- using the one term because he had unwittingly harboured in his house the man who had now slain his son; and the other, because the stranger, who had been sent as his child’s guardian, had turned out his most cruel enemy.
Presently the Lydians arrived, bearing the body of the youth, and behind them followed the homicide. He took his stand in front of the corse, and, stretching forth his hands to Croesus, delivered himself into his power with earnest entreaties that he would sacrifice him upon the body of his son- “his former misfortune was burthen enough; now that he had added to it a second, and had brought ruin on the man who purified him, he could not bear to live.” Then Croesus, when he heard these words, was moved with pity towards Adrastus, notwithstanding the bitterness of his own calamity; and so he answered, “Enough, my friend; I have all the revenge that I require, since thou givest sentence of death against thyself. But in sooth it is not thou who hast injured me, except so far as thou hast unwittingly dealt the blow. Some god is the author of my misfortune, and I was forewarned of it a long time ago.” Croesus after this buried the body of his son, with such honours as befitted the occasion. Adrastus, son of Gordias, son of Midas, the destroyer of his brother in time past, the destroyer now of his purifier, regarding himself as the most unfortunate wretch whom he had ever known, so soon as all was quiet about the place, slew himself upon the tomb. Croesus, bereft of his son, gave himself up to mourning for two full years.
At the end of this time the grief of Croesus was interrupted by intelligence from abroad. He learnt that Cyrus, the son of Cambyses, had destroyed the empire of Astyages, the son of Cyaxares; and that the Persians were becoming daily more powerful. This led him to consider with himself whether it were possible to check the growing power of that people before it came to a head. With this design he resolved to make instant trial of the several oracles in Greece, and of the one in Libya. So he sent his messengers in different directions, some to Delphi, some to Abae in Phocis, and some to Dodona; others to the oracle of Amphiaraus; others to that of Trophonius; others, again, to Branchidae in Milesia. These were the Greek oracles which he consulted. To Libya he sent another embassy, to consult the oracle of Ammon. These messengers were sent to test the knowledge of the oracles, that, if they were found really to return true answers, he might send a second time, and inquire if he ought to attack the Persians.
The messengers who were despatched to make trial of the oracles were given the following instructions: they were to keep count of the days from the time of their leaving Sardis, and, reckoning from that date, on the hundredth day they were to consult the oracles, and to inquire of them what Croesus the son of Alyattes, king of Lydia, was doing at that moment. The answers given them were to be taken down in writing, and brought back to him. None of the replies remain on record except that of the oracle at Delphi. There, the moment that the Lydians entered the sanctuary, and before they put their questions, the Pythoness thus answered them in hexameter verse:-
I can count the sands, and I can measure the ocean;
I have ears for the silent, and know what the dumb man meaneth;
Lo! on my sense there striketh the smell of a shell-covered tortoise,
Boiling now on a fire, with the flesh of a lamb, in a cauldron–
Brass is the vessel below, and brass the cover above it.
These words the Lydians wrote down at the mouth of the Pythoness as she prophesied, and then set off on their return to Sardis. When all the messengers had come back with the answers which they had received, Croesus undid the rolls, and read what was written in each. Only one approved itself to him, that of the Delphic oracle. This he had no sooner heard than he instantly made an act of adoration, and accepted it as true, declaring that the Delphic was the only really oracular shrine, the only one that had discovered in what way he was in fact employed. For on the departure of his messengers he had set himself to think what was most impossible for any one to conceive of his doing, and then, waiting till the day agreed on came, he acted as he had determined. He took a tortoise and a lamb, and cutting them in pieces with his own hands, boiled them both together in a brazen cauldron, covered over with a lid which was also of brass.
Such then was the answer returned to Croesus from Delphi. What the answer was which the Lydians who went to the shrine of Amphiarans and performed the customary rites obtained of the oracle there, I have it not in my power to mention, for there is no record of it. All that is known is that Croesus believed himself to have found there also an oracle which spoke the truth.
After this Croesus, having resolved to propitiate the Delphic god with a magnificent sacrifice, offered up three thousand of every kind of sacrificial beast, and besides made a huge pile, and placed upon it couches coated with silver and with gold, and golden goblets, and robes and vests of purple; all which he burnt in the hope of thereby making himself more secure of the favour of the god. Further he issued his orders to all the people of the land to offer a sacrifice according to their means. When the sacrifice was ended, the king melted down a vast quantity of gold, and ran it into ingots, making them six palms long, three palms broad, and one palm in thickness. The number of ingots was a hundred and seventeen, four being of refined gold, in weight two talents and a half; the others of pale gold, and in weight two talents. He also caused a statue of a lion to be made in refined gold, the weight of which was ten talents. At the time when the temple of Delphi was burnt to the ground, this lion fell from the ingots on which it was placed; it now stands in the Corinthian treasury, and weighs only six talents and a half, having lost three talents and a half by the fire.
On the completion of these works Croesus sent them away to Delphi, and with them two bowls of an enormous size, one of gold, the other of silver, which used to stand, the latter upon the right, the former upon the left, as one entered the temple. They too were moved at the time of the fire; and now the golden one is in the Clazomenian treasury, and weighs eight talents and forty-two minae; the silver one stands in the corner of the ante-chapel, and holds six hundred amphorae. This is known because the Delphians fill it at the time of the Theophania. It is said by the Delphians to be a work of Theodore the Samian, and I think that they say true, for assuredly it is the work of no common artist. Croesus sent also four silver casks, which are in the Corinthian treasury, and two lustral vases, a golden and a silver one. On the former is inscribed the name of the Lacedaemonians, and they claim it as a gift of theirs, but wrongly, since it was really given by Croesus. The inscription upon it was cut by a Delphian, who wished to pleasure the Lacedaemonians. His name is known to me, but I forbear to mention it. The boy, through whose hand the water runs, is (I confess) a Lacedaemonian gift, but they did not give either of the lustral vases. Besides these various offerings, Croesus sent to Delphi many others of less account, among the rest a number of round silver basins. Also he dedicated a female figure in gold, three cubits high, which is said by the Delphians to be the statue of his baking-woman; and further, he presented the necklace and the girdles of his wife.
These were the offerings sent by Croesus to Delphi. To the shrine of Amphiaraus, with whose valour and misfortune he was acquainted, he sent a shield entirely of gold, and a spear, also of solid gold, both head and shaft. They were still existing in my day at Thebes, laid up in the temple of Ismenian Apollo.
The messengers who had the charge of conveying these treasures to the shrines, received instructions to ask the oracles whether Croesus should go to war with the Persians and if so, whether he should strengthen himself by the forces of an ally. Accordingly, when they had reached their destinations and presented the gifts, they proceeded to consult the oracles in the following terms:- “Croesus, of Lydia and other countries, believing that these are the only real oracles in all the world, has sent you such presents as your discoveries deserved, and now inquires of you whether he shall go to war with the Persians, and if so, whether he shall strengthen himself by the forces of a confederate.” Both the oracles agreed in the tenor of their reply, which was in each case a prophecy that if Croesus attacked the Persians, he would destroy a mighty empire, and a recommendation to him to look and see who were the most powerful of the Greeks, and to make alliance with them.
At the receipt of these oracular replies Croesus was overjoyed, and feeling sure now that he would destroy the empire of the Persians, he sent once more to Pytho, and presented to the Delphians, the number of whom he had ascertained, two gold staters apiece. In return for this the Delphians granted to Croesus and the Lydians the privilege of precedency in consulting the oracle, exemption from all charges, the most honourable seat at the festivals, and the perpetual right of becoming at pleasure citizens of their town.
After sending these presents to the Delphians, Croesus a third time consulted the oracle, for having once proved its truthfulness, he wished to make constant use of it. The question whereto he now desired an answer was- “Whether his kingdom would be of long duration?” The following was the reply of the Pythoness:–
Wait till the time shall come when a mule is monarch of Media;
Then, thou delicate Lydian, away to the pebbles of Hermus;
Haste, oh! haste thee away, nor blush to behave like a coward.
Of all the answers that had reached him, this pleased him far the best, for it seemed incredible that a mule should ever come to be king of the Medes, and so he concluded that the sovereignty would never depart from himself or his seed after him. Afterwards he turned his thoughts to the alliance which he had been recommended to contract, and sought to ascertain by inquiry which was the most powerful of the Grecian states.”11
However, Aristotle objects to referring to an individual as at times happy and at other times unhappy. To Aristotle, Happiness is not something that comes and goes. While nobody can be called happy until he is dead, it is the life lived that derives happiness, and this leaves us in a condition where we cannot say whether someone is truly happy. It is just that, at best, we can refer to an individual who has died and say that they lead a happy and good life.
Is Mere Pleasure Happiness and How Is Pleasure a Part of the Good Life
In chapter 5, Aristotle presents his view of pleasure and happiness and is contrary to what most individuals would argue happiness and pleasure to be:
“to judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type seem not without some ground to identify the good or happiness with pleasure.”
While pleasure is not an evil or something bad, pleasure is equally not one of the external goods that he would state that the happy person requires. This does not mean that the happy life is not pleasant; that position would hardly be easily argued. Rather, Aristotle continues in chapter 8 of book 1 on this topic following arguments such as that in chapter 5 where he denies that pleasure is the chief good or happiness. To Aristotle, pleasure is assigned a place in the happy life, but it is not an end.12
Who and What Can Be Happy?
Aristotle does exclude some individuals from his definition of happiness. To Aristotle, Happiness does not fit beings either higher or lower than man. It does not fit the gods, and it does not fit animals. The question is why. In this, we need to ask whether the chief good of an animal is different to that of humanity? Equally, the chief good of the divine being would be different to that of man. The conception of whether an animal can be happy is different to whether an animal can feel pleasure. In seeking to answer the question of whether an animal can be happy, we need to consider whether an animal can contemplate and reflect.
As introspective individuals, we need to consider whether we examine all aspects of our lives and whether this requires that we re-examine what has come before and whether that outcome leads to a worthwhile and fulfilling life.
Questions and Reflections
In order to best understand and comprehend the work, we must question it and think about our understanding by challenging ourselves. Through this, we can learn how to question our own comprehension and whether we have been thorough in understanding what we have read.
- Why can ethics not be defined as an exact science?
- How and why does Aristotle differentiate between blessedness and happiness? What does each of these terms represent?
- Can a child be happy under the terms defined by Aristotle?
- When should people start to learn about ethics as a topic for the youth in a society?
- What of the various classifications of goods that Aristotle defines?
- In constructing what can be seen by Aristotle to represent a happy and good life, what of the various classes and forms of action and existence?
- Aristotle notes that there are two irrational aspects to the soul. What are these?
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Easterling, P. E., Philip Hardie, Richard Hunter, and E. J. Kenney. Herodotus: Histories Book IX. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
McMahon, Darrin M. “The pursuit of happiness in history.” The science of subjective well-being (2008): 80-93.
Rand, Ayn. The virtue of selfishness. Penguin, 1964.
Shapiro, Susan O. “Herodotus and Solon.” Classical Antiquity 15, no. 2 (1996): 348-364.
Younkins, Edward W. “Flourishing & Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism.” (2011).